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Abstract
We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then
strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield com-
petitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors
on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price
wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral
monopoly.
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11 Introduction
As is well-known Walrasian economics is built upon the Hypothesis of Perfect
Competition, which can be taken as in Mas-Colell (1980) to state: “...that
prices are publicly quoted and are viewed by the economic agents as exoge-
nously given”. Attempts to go beyond Walrasian economics have in par-
ticular involved giving “a theoretical explanation of the Hypothesis itself”
(Mas-Colell (1980)). Among these the most remarkable are without doubt
the 19th century contributions of Bertrand, Cournot and Edgeworth (for an
overview, see Stigler (1965)). The Cournot approach was explored inten-
sively, in a general equilibrium framework, in the symposium issue entitled
“Non-cooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition” (Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, Vol. 22 (1980)).
The features common to most of the symposium articles are:
(a) The strategies employed by the agents are of the Cournot type, i.e.,
consist in quoting quantities.
(b) The (insigniﬁcant) size of any agent relative to the market is the key
explanatory variable for the tendency of strategic behavior to approx-
imate perfect competition and, in its wake, to lead to Walrasian out-
comes (Mas-Colell (1980), p.122).
The extension of pure quantity strategies from Cournot’s partial equilib-
rium model of oligopoly to a general equilibrium framework, however, does
raise questions. Underlying the Cournot model is a demand curve for the
particular market under consideration which enables the suppliers to relate
quantities, via prices, to expected receipts. If such a close relationship is not
provided by the market, then it seems more natural to us that an agent will
no longer conﬁne himself to quoting quantities, i.e., to pure buy-or-sell mar-
ket orders. To protect himself against “market uncertainty - or illiquidity, or
manipulation by other agents 1”, he will also quote prices limiting the execu-
tion of those orders, consenting to sell q units of commodity j only if its price
is p or more, or buy ˜ q units only if its price is ˜ p or less. By sending multiple
1to quote from Mertens (2003)
2orders of this kind an agent can approximate any monotone demand or sup-
ply curve in a market by a step function, as was done in Dubey (1982, 1994).
Here we go further and give each agent full manoeuvrability. He places a
continuum of inﬁnitesimal limit-price orders, which in eﬀect enables him to
send any monotone, continuous demand or supply curve for each commodity.
The upshot is a striking result: provided only that all commodity markets
are “active” (i.e. there is positive trade in them), and no matter how thin
they are, strategic (Nash) equilibria (SE) coincide - in outcome space - with
competitive (Walras) equilibria (CE). Our result thus provides a rationale,
based on strategic competition, for Walrasian outcomes even in the case of a
bilateral monopoly. This brings it in sharp contrast to Dubey (1982, 1994),
where it was necessary to have competition on both sides of each market
(in the sense of there being at least two active buyers and two active sellers
for each commodity) in order to conclude that SE are CE . (Always CE are
SE without much ado in both models). The models in Dubey (1982, 1994)
have little to say in the setting of a bilateral monopoly, where they allow for
a continuum of active non-Walrasian SE. (Indeed, the set of SE allocations
coincides with the set of all individually rational allocations). In our model
this continuum disappears, leaving only the CE behind. Thus full manoeu-
vrability of limit-price orders is tantamount to perfect competition. Even in
the presence of monopolists who have cornered several markets and elimi-
nated any vestige of competition from them, every active SE is Walrasian in
our model. This is exactly the important scenario left out in Dubey (1982,
1994).
The models in Dubey (1982, 1994) rely on competition that is “cut-
throat” in the spirit of Betrand. Any agent can take over a whole chunk
of some buy (sell) order from another by quoting an inﬁnitesimally higher
(lower) price. Our model is not based on the possibility of such takeovers.
Instead it requires that agents’ behavior be “smooth”, with commodities
bought (sold) in inﬁnitesimal increments of continuously non-increasing (non-
decreasing) prices. The key point of our paper is that such smooth trading
is a substitute for cut-throat price wars, and also gives rise to Walrasian
outcomes. A monopolist may be in sole command of his own resource, but
nevertheless he will be reduced to behaving as if he had cut-throat rivals,
3once smooth trading sets in. A related phenomenon2 was analyzed in Coase
(1972) (and following Coase (1972), a long line of literature, see e.g. Bulow
(1982), Gaskins (1974), Schmalensee (1979)). There, too, a monopolist was
shown to forfeit his power, but this happened in the setting of durable goods
which could be sold sequentially over time to inﬁnitely patient customers.
In our model the monopolist loses power even with perishable goods which
are traded at one instant of time. But we do need, unlike Coase, strategic
behavior on both sides of the market as well as convex preferences.
It must be emphasized that our model is based on decentralized markets.
Each commodity j is traded against ﬁat money (“unit of account”), and
orders sent to the markets k 6= j for other commodities k, do not aﬀect
how market j functions. Thus we do not allow an agent to link his buy-
order for a commodity to whether the sell-order for another commodity goes
through.3 The only connection between diﬀerent commodity markets is the
budget-constraint of agents, requiring them to cover purchases out of their
sales receipts. Our model is therefore an order-of-magnitude simpler than
that of Mertens (2003), where cross-market limit orders are permitted. In
spite of this paucity of our strategy-space compared to Mertens (2003), we
exactly implement 4 CE via our mechanism (modulo activity in markets). In
contrast, SE form a large superset 5 of CE in Mertens (2003) (though, we
hasten to add, the implementation of CE was never the aim there, rather it
was to well-deﬁne a mechanism that allowed for a rich menu of cross-market
limit-orders).
For better perspective, we consider two somewhat contrasting versions of
our model. In the ﬁrst version agents act under the optimistic illusion that
they can exert perfect price discrimination: sell to others, starting at the
highest quoted price (or buy, starting at the lowest). In the second version
we turn to a standard market game, akin to that of Dubey (1982) and Dubey
2We thank John Geanakoplos for this reference.
3That would be like allowing agents to submit demand functions based on the whole
price vector.
4Indeed, our result may be interpreted in terms of the “mechanism-design” literature
(see Section 4).
5For instance, the SE of Shapley’s “windows model” (see Sahi and Yao (1989)) are also
SE in Mertens’ model.
4(1994). Here each agent is grimly realistic and realizes that he will be able
to buy (sell) only after higher-priced buyers (lower-priced sellers) have been
serviced at the market, and that the prices he gets are apropos his own
quotations, not the best going.6
Though the two versions are built on quite diﬀerent behaviorial hypothe-
ses, we ﬁnd their equilibria lead to the same outcomes, namely Walrasian.
Our model shares some of the weaknesses of the Walrasian models. In
particular, since it is based on the static concept of a strategic equilibrium,
our model does not address the question of what dynamic forces bring the
equilibrium about and ensure that individual strategic plans become jointly
compatible. But it goes beyond the Walrasian notion in at least three im-
portant ways:
(a) It is not assumed that the economic agents face perfectly elastic supply
and demand curves.
(b) Prices are not quoted from outside but set by the agents themselves.
Each agent, operating in a market, realizes and exerts his ability to
inﬂuence price.
(c) Strategies of the individuals (i.e. supply and demand curves submitted
to the market) need not be based on their true characteristics (prefer-
ences and endowments).
2 The First Version: Optimistic Conjectures
and Equilibrium Points
Let N = f1;:::;ng be the set of agents who trade in k commodities. Each
agent i 2 N has an initial endowment ei 2 I R
k
+ n f0g and a preference
relation > »i on I R
k
+ that is convex, continuous and monotonic (in the sense
that x ¸ y, x 6= y implies x Âi y). We assume that
P
i2N
ei À 0, i.e. every
6We could make the same assumption also in the ﬁrst market model. However we would
lose economic insight, as to what happens to the consumers’ and producers’ surplus, when
agents behave like monopolists, trying to exert perfect price discrimination .
5named commodity is present in the aggregate.
An agent may enter a market either as a buyer or a seller, and submit
to each of the k commodity markets a marginal demand or supply curve.
Formally, let
M
+ = ff : I R+ ! I R++j f is continuous and non-decreasingg
M
¡ = ff : I R+ ! I R++j f is continuous and non-increasingg:
















+; for j = 1;:::;k):
In the interpretation di
j(qi
j) is the price at which agent i is willing to
buy an inﬁnitesimal, incremental unit of commodity j, once his level of pur-
chases has reached qi
j. The supply curve has an analogous meaning. Denote
¾ ´ (¾1;:::;¾n) and let S¾
j ;D¾
j be the aggregate supply, demand curves.
We suppose that agent i acts under the optimistic conjecture that he
can exert perfect price discrimination, i.e., that he can sell (buy) starting at
the highest (lowest) prices quoted by the buyers (sellers). This means that
agent i calculates his receipts (or expenditures) on the market j as the inte-
gral, starting from 0, under the curve D¾
j (or S¾
j ). The generally non-convex
budget-set Bi(¾) for ¾ = (¾1;:::;¾n), is then obtained by the requiring that
(perceived) expenditures do not exceed (perceived) receipts, i.e.,
B
i(¾) = fe
i + t j t 2 I R
k;e





























j if q < 0; 0 otherwise.
(Note that ti
j > 0 (ti
j < 0) means that i buys (sells) j .)
6The collection of strategic choices ¾ will be called an equilibrium point




i is > »i -optimal on B













j = supfqj j S
¾
j (qj) · D
¾
j (qj)g for j = 1;:::;k
Conditions (i) and (ii) require that agents optimize and that markets
clear. Condition (iii) says that no trade can be enforced, i.e., it stops when
the (marginal) supply price for the ﬁrst time exceeds the demand price; and,
at the same time, in equilibrium all trades compatible with the submitted
strategies are actually carried out.
An EP will be called active if there is positive trade in each market.






any commodity j takes place at one price, pj.
Lemma 1. The curves S¾
j and D¾
j coincide and are constant on [0;Tj] at
any EP .
Proof. For any j, let Gj := fi : ti
j > 0g; Hj := fi : ti
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The third inequality follows from (iii); the other four follow from monotonic-
















j) for j = 1;:::;k:
















j) for i = 1;:::;n:















j) for j = 1;:::;k:




j (Tj) = D
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Since by (iii), D¾
j ¸ S¾







In view of the Lemma 1 we can talk not only of the allocation but also the
prices produced at an active EP . These are the constant values of S¾
j ;D¾
j on
[0;Tj] for j = 1;:::;k. Note that these prices are positive by assumption.
Proposition 1. The prices and allocation at an active equilibrium point are
Walrasian.
Proof. Let ¾ be an EP with trades t1;:::;tn and prices p . We need to show
that, for each i , ei + ti is > »i -optimal on the set
B
i(p) := fe
i + t : t 2 I R
k;e
i + t 2 I R
k
+; p:t = 0g:
9W.l.o.g. ﬁx i = 1, put
J1 := fj : t
1
j > 0g
J2 := fj : t
1
j < 0g












jj : j 2 J1 [ J2g; fTj : j 2 J3g]
Nj := f® 2 I R : jt
1
j ¡ ®j < ±jg
Fj := Ej ¡ Rj
(Since the EP is active, ±j > 0). Now we claim, for j = 1;:::;k:
Fj is continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing on Nj (8)
and its derivative at t
1
j is pj:
This follows from the continuity and strict positivity of Sj and Dj, and from
Lemma 1 which implies:
(9) Fj(q) coincides with Ej(q) = pjq if j 2 J1; 0 · q · t
1
j
(10) Fj(q) coincides with ¡ Rj(q) = pjq if j 2 J2; t
1
j · q · 0
(11) Fj(q) = pjq if j 2 J3; q 2 Nj:





j) = 0, and F(t1
j) > 0 (< 0) if j 2 J1 (j 2 J2), it follows
that there is a neighborhood V of (t1
2;:::;t1
k) in N2 £ ::: £ Nk such that
if (t2;:::;tk) 2 V then there is a unique t1 which satisﬁes the equation
F1(t1) + ::: + Fk(tk) = 0. Thus we have an implicit function G(t2;:::;tk) =
¡F2(t2)¡:::¡Fk(tk) deﬁned on V which is clearly continuously diﬀerentiable.
Finally the point t1 = (t1
1;:::;t1
k) belongs by construction to the hypersurface
10M = f(G(t2;:::;tk);t2;:::;tk) : (t2;:::;tk) 2 V g and, by (8), the tangent
plane H to M at this point has normal p .
Since we are at an EP; e1 +t1 is > »1-optimal on (e1 +M)\I R
k
+. Suppose
that there is some x 2 H+ := (e1 + t1 + H) \ I R
k
+ such that x Â1 e1 + t1.
By continuity of Â »1 we can ﬁnd a neighborhood Z of x (in I R
k
+) with the
property: y 2 Z ) y Â1 e1+t1. But since M is a smooth surface there exists
a point y¤ in Z, such that the line segment between y¤ and e1 + t1 pierces
e1+M at some point z¤ 2 (e1+M)\I R
k
+ (see Fig.1). By convexity of > »1, we
have z¤ Â1 e1+t1, contradicting that e1+t1 is > »1-optimal on (e1+M)\I R
k
+ .
We conclude that e1+t1 is > »1-optimal on H+ . But we have e1 2 H+ (simply
set trades to be zero, i.e., pick ¡t1 in H). Therefore, in fact, H+ = B1(p).
Since the choice of i = 1 was arbitrary, the proposition follows.
................. Insert Figure 1 approximately here!.................
Proposition 2. If the trades t1;:::;tn and prices p À 0 are Walrasian, then
they can be achieved at an EP
Proof. For any i let
J
i














































j(x)g if j 2 Ji
1g
Then it is readily checked that these strategies constitute a EP and produce
the trades t1;:::;tn at prices p.
113 The Second Version: Strategic Market Game
and Nash Equilibria
The previous results can be expressed in the form of Nash Equilibria of a (gen-
eralized 7) strategic game. The game is deﬁned as in Dubey (1982, 1994),
except that strategies are not step functions, but rather continuously diﬀer-
entiable (i.e., we now take M+ and M¡ to consist of weakly monotonic C1
functions). For simplicity of exposition, we also suppose that an agent enters
a commodity market either as a buyer or as a seller, not both. (This can be
dropped as in Dubey (1982)). Given the strategy-selection ¾ = (¾1;:::;¾n)
by the agents, let D¾
j and S¾
j denote the aggregate (strategic) demand and
supply curves. If S¾
j lies above D¾
j , then no trade takes place, i.e., ti
j(¾) = 0





supfq 2 I R+ : Dj(q) ¸ Sj(q)g if the sup is ﬁnite
some arbitrary positive number M, otherwise.
................. Insert Figure 2 approximately here!.................
Deﬁne pj(¾) to be the intersection price of S¾
j and D¾
j if the sup is ﬁnite





D¾(q)] otherwise (see Fig. 3).
................. Insert Figure 3 approximately here!.................
The individual trades ti
j(¾) are determined as follows. In the event that
the sup in Tj(¾) is ﬁnite, all purchases (sales) of quantities quoted above
(below) pj(¾) occur, with arbitrary rationing, e.g., proportional on the mar-
gin”, i.e., quantities that are in excess (either on the supply or the demand
side) and that are quoted at the price pj(¾) are rationed. In the event that
7See Remark 2, however, on how to replace the generalized game by a proper game
12the sup in Tj(¾) is not ﬁnite, all purchases (sales) of quantities quoted above
(below) D¾
j (M) (S¾
j (M)) occur, with arbitrary rationing of quantities quoted
for purchase at D¾
j (M) or for sales at S¾
j (M).
For any strategy choice e ¾i of agent i denote by (¾je ¾i) the n-tuple
















j if q < 0;= 0 otherwise







(Now we adopt the convention that a buyer (seller) pays (receives) the area
under his own demand (supply) curve.)





i.e. markets always clear. However, when i considers a deviation from e ¾i, it
may happen that ei
j +ti
j(¾je ¾i) < 0 for some j, i.e., the trader i is called upon




















The mechanism is not at fault on either count. It is blind to the private
characteristics, as well as to the strategic manipulations, of the individual
agents. In each market the signals submitted are resolved into trades and
payments via the mechanism’s publicly known rule. It is for the individual to
ensure that his signal leads to trades he can honor, and that across markets
he balances his budget. This motivates the deﬁnition of Σi(¾) below of the
13following strategy sets for each player i :
Σ
























Pi(¾) is the set of strategies of i that lead to feasible trades for him















i); for all e ¾
i 2 Σ
i(¾); i = 1;:::;n:
Then propositions 1, 2 remain true with SE substituted for EP . To see

































and then reread the proof of the Lemma 1 with b Ej; b Rj in place of Rj;Ej (in
eﬀect reversing the chain of inequalities). This proves that, at any SE, all
trade takes place at one price. The rest of the proof proceeds as before, after
noting the following changes. Consider Tj, the total trade in commodity j at
the SE under consideration, and the (unique) price pj at which Tj is traded in
the SE. Also denote the aggregate demand and supply curves for commodity
j by Dj and Sj . Now it is clear that an agent can (via unilateral deviations
in strategy at the SE)
(i) buy up to Tj at the price pj (simply by quoting to buy more, in the event
that he is being rationed)
14(ii) buy x > Tj , at the price Sj(x) (by quoting the ﬂat curve whose price is
Sj(x)).
Thus his expenditure for buying x is Ej(x) = xSj(x).
Similarly his receipts from selling x is Rj(x) = xDj(x). Both Ej and Rj are
C1, since Sj and Dj are C1 by hypothesis. Now the proofs hold exactly as
before.
Remark 1 : (Proof against Pretension) We could enhance the strategy-
set of an agent by allowing him to pretend to be any ﬁnite number of agents
as he wishes, aggregating the trades he obtains via his proxies, provided the
aggregate trade is feasible for him. This, as can easily be veriﬁed, would
not disturb the equilibrium (i.e., he could not get higher utility by such a
manoeuver).
Remark 2 : (Proper Game) It is also possible to describe a proper game








j or if ei
j + tj(¾je ¾i) < 0 , as
is done in Dubey (1982, 1994). Moreover, the penalties can be brought on
by a rule for conﬁscating commodities in amounts commensurate with the
size of the default, as discussed there. (They can be trivially be brought
on by conﬁscating the entire consumption, in eﬀect inﬂicting a huge penalty
on agents who violate their feasibility constraints. For then each agent will
simply prefer not to trade and to consume his initial endowment.)
Remark 3 : (Inactive markets) For any subset L ½ f1;:::;kg of com-
modities, one can deﬁne Walras equilibrium modulo L, by restricting trade
to only commodities in L and restricting the preferences to this subspace
of trades. Then our analysis shows that an SE yields Walras equilibrium
modulo the set of commodities whose markets are active at the SE.
Remark 4 : (Equilibrium Reﬁnement) Imagine a “market maker” who
endeavours to trigger trade at market j by oﬀering to buy (and, sell) up
to ² > 0 units of commodity j at some common price pj and to buy (sell)
more at smoothly decreasing (increasing) prices. We shall call this an “²-
perturbation” of market j. Treating each market maker as a strategic dummy,
and postulating that he creates the commodities and the money that the
mechanism calls upon him to deliver, the game is well deﬁned even after
some markets are ²-perturbed. We shall say that an NE is reﬁned it there
exist ²-perturbations of its inactive markets that do not disturb the NE. It
15is then trivial to verify (using the convexity of preferences) that the prices
and allocations of reﬁned NE coincide with the CE of the underlying econ-
omy, i.e., reﬁnement eliminates the need for the extended Walras equilibria
of Remark 3. (Note that reﬁned NE would be unaﬀected if we required ²-
perturbations of all the markets; the market-maker could simply trade ² with
himself at the NE price formed at each active market).
Other, more sophisticated, versions of reﬁnement can be thought of. One
could consider the NE of the game in which all markets are ²-perturbed, and
take the limit of these NE as ² ! 0. With some additional constraints on
the perturbations, this should lead to the same reﬁned NE, but we will not
pursue the inquiry here.
4 Mechanism Design
The strategic market game of Section 3 can be interpreted in the context
of mechanism design (see Postlewaite (1985)), once we observe that agents’
strategy-sets are invariant of their preferences.8 To bring our strategy-to-
outcome map in line with that literature, let us deﬁne (pro forma) the out-
come to be no-trade if any agent winds up being infeasible (i.e. either violates
his budget constraint or is called upon to sell more of any commodity than
he has ). This yields a “strategic outcome function” as in Postlewaite (1985).
Next, given any economy, deﬁne the set of “extended Walras equilibria” to
be the union of Walras equilibria modulo L, as L varies over all possible
subsets of commodities. Then, in the terminology of Postlewaite (1985), Re-
mark 3 implies that the “Nash performance correspondence” of our strategic
outcome function exactly implements the extended Walras correspondence 9;
8In our model even more is true. The game is truly “anonymous” in the sense of
Dubey, Mas-Colell, and Shubik (1980): all agents have the same message space, and the
trade that the market assigns to any agent (prior to a feasibility check on him) depends in
an identical way on his message and the distribution (indeed aggregate) of all messages.
9Given a CE modulo L, one can construct an NE on the L-subeconomy to match the
CE as in the proof of Proposition 2. Then deﬁne strategies on the set f1;:::;kg n L of
inactive markets as follows. Let some agents quote supply curves starting at exorbitantly
high prices, while others quote demand curves starting at ridiculously low prices (scaling
the CE prices up, if necessary, to make this feasible). Provided that the marginal rates
16while Remark 4 implies that the “reﬁned Nash performance correspondence”
exactly implements the Walras correspondence.
Of course, others have presented mechanisms which implement the Walras
correspondence (see, e.g., Hurwicz (1979). Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite
(1980), Schmeidler (1980), all of whom, incidentally, require at least three
agents and bypass the case of a bilateral monopoly). It is not our intention
just to add to this list. We were instead inspired by the fact that the “double
auction” - which underlies our mechanism - has a long and rich history, not
only in academia, but in real market processes (see Friedman and Rust (1993)
for an excellent survey). Our analysis reveals that a “smoothened” version
of the double auction will make for eﬃciency and help to break monopoly
power. It thereby implies that, if the “price-jumps” permitted in the bid-
ders’ strategies are reduced by mandate (of the auction-designer), every such
reduction will tend to come with eﬃciency gains. To that extent, we hope
that our analysis will also be of some interest to applied economists who are
concerned with the general properties of double auctions.
of substitution between commodities are bounded, we obtain a full-ﬂedged NE which
replicates the CE. This, in conjunction with Remark 3, shows the exact implementation.
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